木心《文学回忆录(上册)》

第一讲 希腊罗马神话(一)

  • “木屋”寓言:只要心意诚,神祗就大,智慧更大
  • 古人类最大的快乐:非劳动,非性爱,而是战争胜利之后,唱跳欢乐;久而久之,诗出;
  • 文学以前是文字的起源:战歌,祷词,劳动号子;
  • “史前期”的希腊神话,否定之否定,无论,动物性;朱庇特家族后,希腊神话正文开始,极具人性
  • 欧罗巴:朱庇特化身白牛,渐近,美女套花环于牛,牛跪,女骑,牛走 — 心理描写很对:人见到初爱的人,从不直接趋前;
  • 巴克斯精神:人类的快乐,不是靠理性、电脑、物质,而来自情感、直觉、本能、快乐行动;
  • 阿里安因情人走,知巴克斯更好;巴克斯因阿里安死,更知其可贵;
  • 神话,多听,多想,人得以归真返璞;希腊神话,无为而治,自在自为;中国神话,善恶相报,太现实,神权、夫权渗透,令人惧怕;
  • 阿波罗追随达佛涅,以肉身之爱追求形上之爱;
  • 画中,人多与狮和羊一起安然共听俄耳浦斯弹奏——这是人类的理想
  • 俄耳浦斯回头,欧律狄刻骤失 — 天琴座;
  • 狄安娜误为阿波罗所骗,射死俄里翁 — 猎户座;
  • 每年早春,阿多尼斯出见维纳斯,六月后返地狱:阿多尼斯象征春天,维纳斯象征爱;
  • 人间英雄赫拉克勒斯,终生劳作无止息,象征白昼,那十二件大事,或指黄道十二宫,或一年十二月,或白昼十二时;
  • 希腊众神之上,有一命运,诸神无可抗拒;

第二讲 希腊罗马神话(二)

  • 悲剧写命运,人的反抗毫无用处;中国算命,可卜生死,但从未有人问:谁决定命运?
  • 爱琴士之子之子忒修斯杀怪成功,循线出迷楼,弃阿里安,遭惩罚,父投海自杀 — 爱琴海;
  • 俄狄浦斯,典型之命运悲剧,弑父,娶母,命运无法逃避
  • 美少年林达,天天游到岛上,赫罗执火炬迎候,后一日风浪太大,被吞没,赫罗举火炬彻夜等候,至晨见林达尸,悲而入海,拥抱着林达死去——“这神话简单,然而动人。”
  • 迷楼,象征社会,监囚人,人不得出,包括婚姻、法律、契约;唯一的办法是飞,(伊卡洛斯)宁可飞高,宁可摔死;
  • 那耳喀索斯是人的自我,水中倒影便是艺术,超自我的自我;艺术不能实际占有,只可保持距离;现实主义者取消距离,水即乱——人生与艺术的宿命;
  • 整个人类文化就是自恋,自恋文化是人类文化;
  • 口传,好则留,坏则不留,到现代近世,传播出版发达,坏的容易传播,好的不易流传——人类文化的悲哀,是流俗的易传,高雅的失传
  • 古代只有文学,没有作家,个人完全湮没;洞窟壁画,从不签名;哲学家不写书;古文化结结巴巴地传下来;
  • 人类不安分,动物性是稳定的,正常的;伟大的文艺,记录的都不是幸福,而是不安与骚乱;
  • 希腊神话是一笔美丽得发昏的糊涂账。因为糊涂,因为发昏,才如此美丽。

第三讲 希腊史诗

  • 人人知道荷马,谁读过荷马?人所崇拜的东西,常是他们不知道的东西。
  • 诗人、子、书,是最高尊称:荷马是诗人,诗人就是荷马;孔丘为“子”,新旧约为“书”;
  • 《伊利亚特》阳刚:王子抢海伦,丈夫开战,众神参战,希腊军内讧,阿喀琉斯退战,请战,请其友出,死,为战友复仇,亲往战,胜,回来葬友;
  • 世界各大国、各大族,历史都很丰富悲壮,但伟大的诗才太少 — 中国没有史诗;
  • 《奥德赛》温和的,富人情味;
  • 史诗中的英雄美人,性格鲜明——古典文学的方法论;荷马史诗的“神”与“人”,既有性格上的相通,又有凡尘和天庭的差异,希腊传统的又一个好典范;
  • “人类有童年。各民族有各自的童年。希腊这孩童最健康,他不是神童,很正常、很活泼,故荷马史诗是人类健康活泼时期的诗。” — 迅速,直捷,明白,壮丽;
  • 荷马喜用“Similes”(简洁的比喻),直捷,不深奥,不暗示:(希腊奔赴前进)大火吞没森林;(匆忙的声音)群鸟噪音;(军队聒噪)苍蝇飞鸣;(军败退)羊群奔散;
  • 克罗齐的唯心史观:历史不属于科学(“普遍”性)的范畴,属于艺术的范畴 — 历史并不在于理解客体,而仅止于凝想那个客体;
  • 荷马史诗是历史与艺术的理想结合;司马迁《史记》“史家之绝唱,无韵之离骚”,也很理想;

第四讲 希腊悲剧及其他

  • “那时候地球上出现许多天才,伟大的人格、伟大的思想,而柏拉图、亚里士多德压根儿不知道老子、孔子、释迦牟尼。”
  • 希腊的酒神精神,最符合艺术家性格;“诗人不宜多知世事” — 希腊整个文化艺术像是一个童贞的美少年,想起希腊,好像那里一天到晚都是早晨,空气清凉新鲜;
  • 多神 — 泛神 — 无神:希腊的活泼健康,是他们早在神的多元性上,伏下了无神论的观念;而一神很难通向泛神;此所以尼采无比向往希腊;文艺复兴,复的也是希腊精神;
  • 为什么希腊悲剧能净化心灵?事已至此,好自为之;正视命运,正视之后,是好自为之——人道;希腊将“美”在人道中推到第一位;朴素的唯美主义;为什么美好?美就是快乐;希腊没有历史负担,没有传统风俗、习惯、教条约束;天然地没有伤感情调,希腊的一切艺术,真实、朴素、单纯
  • 埃斯库罗斯,暴狂,有力;索福克勒斯,从宗教热情转到人间合理化;欧里庇得斯,写人间普通人,浪漫主义的开山祖 — 道德即美,不应赏罚是非;

第五讲 新旧约的故事和涵义

  • 《圣经》不是神学的总集,没有被清理、被规范,所以庞杂,像人类生活本身,忍耐、懦弱、胜利、失败,像一个老实人的日记;所以文字明白简朴,思想直接有力;
  • 《旧约》的文字与思想,天然和谐,出于希伯来人的语言;《新约》的作者似乎都是犹太人;
  • (作者)坚持《新约》的文学价值高于《旧约》,纪德、王尔德的观点也相同;
  • (《旧约》)“出埃及记”,故事性强,“创世记”,艺术家必须读;(作者)偏爱“诗篇”和“雅歌”,美丽幽婉,沁人肺腑;“现代人只要忘掉现代,同样可以肝肠如火,色笑似花。”
  • 《新约》采用口语化的文体,得以广为宣传;(作者)每当写出近乎“圣经体”,心中光明快乐,如登宝山,似归故乡;为什么文字趋近《圣经》风格会莫名其妙地安静、畅快?(神秘点)圣灵感召;(实在点)归真返朴;

第六讲 新旧约再谈

  • 耶稣的理想主义毫无目标;以现代理性看耶稣的话,破洞很多;要不求甚解地去解;不求甚解就是一种解;包涵、圆融地看;
  • 耶稣反对发誓;真正的善,不必誓;可世界誓言不断,耶稣归耶稣说,人类归人类做;
  • 凡真的先知,总是时而雄辩,时而结巴;“一个爱我的人,如果爱得讲话结结巴巴,语无伦次,我就知道他爱我。”
  • 艺术家能以自身的快乐来证明世俗的快乐不是万能的:康德从不出家门,克尔凯郭尔只玩过一次柏林;
  • 耶稣的思想襟怀,纯粹理想主义,极端无政府主义,形上的,空灵的,不能实践的 — “真理”大致如此,凡切实可行的不是真理;
  • 耶稣看到百合花,想到人类的枉自劳苦;耶稣、老子、乔达摩,都是极度真诚敏感 — 弄虚作假的人其实是麻木的;他们鉴貌辨色,八面玲珑,而对自然、宇宙,极麻木;真正敏于感受,是内心真诚的人;

第七讲 福音

  • 献身信仰,不能考虑伦理伦常关系;苦行,如羊放入狼群,要机警如蛇,驯良如鸽;
  • 小孩子在学校走,突告母亲、姐姐送伞来,必羞臊 — 小学,性质上就是伊甸园;儿童有儿童的浪漫主义,一时出现父母,即拉回现世;天堂人间不能共存,世俗和理想难以沟通;

第八讲 新旧约续谈

  • 大多数人是愚氓,极少数人是精英;听道的群众,顽石点头了,点过之后,依然是顽石;教堂,人进人出,谁懂教堂?你来也罢,不来也罢,但总有二三贤者智者懂;
  • 为什么先知、宗教家、哲学家要用比喻?人类的智力还在低级阶段;最美的是数学音乐,令人着迷,完全没有比喻;绘画和文学都脱不了比喻;
  • 先知在故乡不受尊敬 — 艺术家要留一份“神秘感”;你自以为君子坦荡荡,结果呢,招鬼上门,引狼入室;
  • (“马太”十四章)某次五千人听道,饿,耶稣以五个饼、两条鱼,掰开平分,都得到,还有余 — 没有比这个比喻更显示艺术的伟大功能;艺术以最少的材料,表呈最多的涵量;
  • (“马太”十四章)传道散了,耶稣独自在海面走;门徒惊异,耶稣说勿惊;彼得也从水面过去,怕落水,呼救,耶稣拉他的手近拢,说,你这小信的人,为什么不信我? — 一个人能否成大器,主观因素最重要,被人忽略的是信心,是信念;信心来自天性的纯真朴厚;
  • 一个人衷心赞美别人,欣赏别人,幸福最多——他是在调整自己,发现自己;自我教育
  • 爱,原来是一场自我教育;耶稣对人类的爱,是一场单恋。

第九讲 东方的圣经

  • 西方大科学家不满于老是追求科学,总想进入哲学、宗教;不能太早做浪子(艺术家),要在宗教、哲学里泡一泡;
  • 乔达摩:自我牺牲,清静寂寞,思辨深刻,灵感丰富;佛教不需要人祭,重视悔过和祈祷;犹太教讲崇拜,基督教重内心修行;
  • 研究佛经,是东方智者和知识分子的一个“底”;
  • 宗教长期迫害哲学家,哲学家不迫害宗教,但可置宗教于死命;一个是信仰,一个是怀疑;宗教是由对自然现象要求正名而来,正名,赋形,遂有人身的神的形象出现;
  • 音乐、建筑、绘画所体现的宗教情操——圆融的刚执,崇高的温柔
  • 人类这般伟大、聪明,为什么不用于人类,而去奉神?给父母、子弟、情人的,也不及把人类最好的情操送给上帝,送给宗教;

第十讲 印度的史诗、中国的诗经

  • 《摩诃婆罗多》讲战争,艰深,有哲学,难懂;《罗摩衍那》讲英雄,浪漫,易传;
  • (《摩》)依卡拉夫耶求师不得,塑特洛那泥像,特洛那亲自去看,孩子下跪听训,称可献任何东西给老师,遂割大拇指——愚忠;古人最高情感是“忠”;古人忠而愚,今人聪明,但也失去了真挚的情感,智慧是思维,道德只是行为的一部分;
  • (《罗》)老二不肯受位,置金鞋而代为王——好人和好人之间的戏剧性;
  • 中国的神话是零星的;神话、英雄,加天才,即史诗,中国没有此物;
  • 《郑风·将仲子》写女性心理,好极,委婉之极;最要讲的是“仲可怀也”,却讲了那么多,不拘四言五言七言;
  • “中世纪所谓蒙昧,倒是保存了人的元气。”

第十一讲 诗经续谈

第十二讲 楚辞与屈原

  • 贫穷是一种浪漫;
  • 政治、生活、爱情都成功,可以是伟大的文学家,譬如歌德;政治、生活、爱情都失败,更可以是伟大的文学家,譬如屈原;
  • 文学可以抓到痒处,绘画强迫给人接受画家个人的意象,文学给人想象的余地;
  • 屈原的死,也是作品,是一种自我完成;屈原写诗,一定知道他已经永垂不朽;每个大艺术家生前都公正地衡量过自己,有人熬不住,说出来,如但丁、普希金,有种人不说的,如陶渊明;
  • 《九歌》中《少司命》《山鬼》两篇最好;神,鬼,都是人性的升华;比希腊神话更优雅,更安静,极端唯美主义;

第十三讲 中国古代的历史学家

  • 《诗经》被政治家、儒家弄成尊严和工具;后人都不敢将《诗经》编入文选;可见儒家在中国势力之大,成了集体潜意识;儒家是最重功利的 — 对待《诗经》,伪善,霸道;汉乐府偷偷继承发扬《诗经》;竹林七贤,建安七子,陶渊明,不被教条吓倒,仍把《诗经》作为文学看待;中国的纯文学,是《诗经》,是《楚辞》;
  • 中国古代历史,一上来就是文学,已经写得极其完美;古代之所以有这光荣现象,因为文学家、史家、哲学家都是贯通的 — 古代文化的总和性现象,一定出华而又实的大人物;现代分工,是投机取巧;
  • 老子精炼奥妙,庄子汪洋恣肆,孟子庄严雄辩,墨子质朴生动,韩非子犀利明畅,荀子严密透辟,孔子圆融周到——孔子调皮、滑头,话从不说死;
  • 国穷民穷,或可转富,精神文化一失,再也回不来;
  • “郑伯克段于鄢” — 讥笑了哥哥,责备了弟弟,而且批评他们自己的家事弄到像两国交战 — 高度的概括,态度、立场、观点都毫不假借,就叫做“春秋笔法”;
  • 左丘明著《左转》,盲者,生平不可考 — 只留作品,不留作者,这是大自然的作风;他是第一个以文学水平写史书的人;
  • 如果司马迁不全支持孔丘立场,而用李耳的宇宙观治史,以他的天才,《史记》这才真正伟大——不可能,中国文化五千年、三千年,几乎没有哲学家,没有正式的大自然科学家;诸子百家是热心于王、霸的伦理学家、权术家;什么是哲学?是思考宇宙,思考人在宇宙的位置,思考生命意义,无功利可言;
  • 读《史记》,当司马迁写出人物、忘掉儒家时,是他最精彩的部分;古时候不写商人,不写流氓,司马迁才气大,胆魄大,皆入文章,写得出了神,忘了儒家的训诫;

第十四讲 先秦诸子:老子

  • 春秋战国,哲学的黄金时代,中国从那以后不再出哲学家了,吃老本吃了两千多年,坐吃山空;胡适当初写《中国哲学史大纲》,只有上集,下集写不出;
  • 宇宙观决定世界观,世界观决定人生观,老子、庄子、尼采、释迦牟尼,都从这样顺序而思考的;
  • 一般书生之见、市侩之见,乃至学者、专家、大儒,都说老子消极、悲观、厌世;从五十年代开始,要求人人都要积极、乐观、热爱生活;
  • 具有永恒性、世界性的中国哲学家,恐怕不多;诸子百家,是伦理学家,研究社会结构、人际关系;是政论家,讨论治国之策;只有老子思考宇宙生命;庄子,是老子的继续,是老子哲理的艺术化;
  • 老子主张退、守、弱、柔;“民不畏死,奈何以死惧之” — 暴君和暴民;老子的理想世界,全然梦境,是他个人的诗的乌托邦;“无为”“无治”是生气,是绝望,是唱反调,是现状逼得他往极端走;“天地不仁” — 决绝的人生观、世界观;“道”是他的理论支点(黑格尔的总念,观念先于物质而存在);
  • 凡宇宙观糊涂,或者忽而偏向有神论,忽而偏向无神论,想说又不敢说,或者说不清,总是差劲的,不能算哲学家;例如孔丘;
  • “蒙田不事体系”;建立体系而成一家之言,并不难,不事体系而能千古不朽,却是极难极难;
  • (卡普拉)“《道德经》就是以一种令人费解的、似乎不合逻辑的风格写成的,它充满了迷人的矛盾,它那有力而富有诗意的语言,捕获了读者的心灵,使读者摆脱了习以为常的逻辑推理的轨道。”

第十五讲 先秦诸子:孔子、墨子

  • 孔丘的思想与李耳正好相反,乐观、积极、务实;他的理想是恢复尧、舜、文、武的礼乐,以中庸之道架构人伦关系;根据周公的原则,周详地建立了一个生活模式;
  • 整本《论语》文学性极强;几乎是精炼的散文诗;文学的伟大,在于某种思想过时了,某种观点荒谬错误,如果文学性强,就不会消失;
  • 儒家重礼、厚葬、守制,目的是尽人事,以愚孝治国,是宗族主义的大传统;墨翟一下子就看出不对,根本在于“真诚”;孔子是偷换概念的老手,墨子诚实、聪明;
  • 墨家不重文采,但通顺朴实,明白痛快,条理严谨,逻辑性很强;墨子认为孔子的“仁”,没有新意,是“以水救水,以火救火”,救不出名堂来的;孔子的宿命论不是宇宙观上的宿命,他在世界观、人生观上的宿命是伪宿命论,目的是为帝王提供麻痹奴隶们的自强;墨子的思想就是科学、民主、平等、博爱的先驱;
  • 帝制长期的统治,一定得伪善,礼表法里;

第十六讲 先秦诸子:孟子、庄子、荀子及其他

  • 中国哲学少得可怜;西方哲学像歌剧,中国哲学像民歌;
  • 但孟子文学才能极高;墨子吃点亏,文学才能不及其余;老庄是不折不扣的艺术家;
  • (诗人死得早,哲学家多长寿)“吾善养吾浩然之气”,(作者认为)“浩然之气”指元气,艺术会给你不尽元气,一份诚意,换一份元气;
  • 中国的伦理观是孔孟的,艺术观是老庄的;汉的赋家,魏晋高士,唐代诗人,全从庄子来;嵇康、李白、苏轼,诠释庄子思想;一直流到民国的鲁迅,骨子里都是庄子思想;石涛、八大,似信佛,也是庄子思想;
  • “至人无己,神人无功,圣人无名”,禅的境界,是要把生命寂灭;浪漫主义致命的弱点,是拼命追求自然,最后弄到不自然
  • 荀子将“法”填入“礼”,历代帝王的统治术,历来不肯明说,扬孔而隐荀;(谭嗣同)两千年来之学,荀学也;
  • “神莫大于化道”,“神”,微妙的事理,高深的修养,“化道”,受知识的熏陶而使气质变化——学问的最高境界;
  • 为什么这些古代史家、哲学家、思想家,都有这么高的文学才华?到宋代、近代,文学才能就差了?思维、情操的创造性,必然伴随着形式的创造性;后世哲学家不过是思想的翻版、盗版,不是创造性的,所以,不可能有文学性;
  • 每一宗教的创教者,都是坦荡真诚的;凡教会就有功利性,然而又不能公开,故向上用经院哲学,向下是标语口号;任何一种意识形态,先要从语言入手,共产运动也是如此;

第十七讲 魏晋文学

  • 两种思潮:希伯来思潮,希腊思潮;前者苦行,克制,重来世,理想,修行,但做不到,必伪善,违反人性;后者是重现世,重快乐,肉体,欲望,享受;世界史总是两种思潮起伏,很分明;唯中国没有希腊思潮;
  • 艺术家的才能自是天赋,创造美,又是天赋中的天赋;富有艺术才能而不能创造美:卡拉瓦乔,库尔贝,米勒,珂勒惠支;又例如达芬奇,他想画丑,可是画不出来,他对丑是盲的;
  • 《世说新语》,洋洋大观,其实草草;一言一语记录得如此之详;外国历史、中国历史的其他时期,都没有这样的文体;其中许多观点过时了,和现代不能通,没有永久意义,好在记录是真实的,注解是翔实的,最好是好在文体,一刀一刀,下刀轻快;

第十八讲 谈音乐

第十九讲 陶渊明及其他

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James Joyce – Dubliners & 白先勇《台北人》

Day one

  • 乔伊斯的短篇小说集《都柏林人》以童年视角开端,就像将要讲述一个人一生的电影,在懵懂纯真的视角中拉开帘幕。The sisters或许应该改名为神父之死,神父詹姆斯福林因瘫痪而告别人世,但原因竟是由于打破了圣杯所以才抑郁而终。笔下的主人公“我”在惶恐和困惑中直面或许是人生中第一次发生在身边的死亡,有太多想不明白的问题,也有太多灰暗本不属于童年。
  • 白先勇的《台北人》拉出上海名媛尹雪艳打头阵,大师果然出手不凡,精细而不失犀利的笔触下,聪明伶俐左右逢源的沙龙女主人活脱脱跃然纸上。虽然写的是一个人,但着眼更多的是那一个时代,一段风华,一段过往。新旧时局交界处,有些人更欢喜而有些人更哀愁,但他们都在那一片烟雾缭绕的大观园里熙熙攘攘。人事皆水流花落,但“永远的尹雪艳”不得不令人称赞称奇。

Day two

  • 乔伊斯继续沿用童年视角+主题直至结尾才姗姗来迟的手法讲述他眼中旧社会的僵固黑暗与压抑,只不过这一次,“我”和主角有了更为直接和具体的交锋。本文中译名为《偶遇》,这事实上不过是另一种“偶然与必然”的反讽——主人公逃离了原本的噩梦,来到了一个亲切和蔼而自由的新世界,但最后发现这不过是天方夜谭,而以往憎恶的狰狞嘴脸却依然伴其左右。而与“我”同行的另一个小伙伴形成了与自身的强烈对比,说不定他就是“另一个我”呢。这个小故事采用典型的“出走(逃离)—寻找(自我发现)—幻灭”叙事方法,象征意味浓厚。
  • 《一把青》读完,就像结尾处端上来的麻婆豆腐一样辛辣十足,却又如师娘那般让人哑口无声。辛辣的地方在于上下二篇发生在朱青身上的强烈对比,从衣着,言语,处事,以及对爱情和亡夫的态度,而这一切又恰恰让我们这些旁观者不知说何是好。师娘的角色就如同乔伊斯笔下的小男孩“我”,扮演着一个冷眼旁观但又不失温情的叙事者角色,和主角一样从头到尾亲历了所有时局的变迁和动荡,仿佛在讲述着作者的思考与困惑——是否会有更好的可能,但更多则是一种随遇而安的妥协与默默接受罢了。

Day three

  • 小男孩再度踏上旅途,只不过动机换成了懵懂的爱情,因此文章的色调也清新温暖了许多。读到结尾处,心里会一直期待会有什么惊喜发生,但昏暗破旧毫无生气的Araby集市最终不但彻底打消了男孩的憧憬,还让其心生一丝对自己的厌恶。实际上,与上一篇结尾的“峰回路转”相比,《阿拉比》的特别之处在于这一结局来得是如此平缓而又自然,从出发前的不顺,路上的耽搁,直到最后在摊主面前的退缩,反射的正是小男孩曾经美满的梦想被现实一点一点被蚕食的过程。本文少对话,大量的客观描摹正是作者该用意的外在表现。
  • 岁除夜,诉衷肠,醉酒而终。区别于《台北人》中已经出场的前几位女性角色,赖鸣升已然被新时代所抛弃,但却依然活在过去“荣耀与辉煌”的记忆里。这段过去,既是沙场上的折戟沉沙,也是壮年时的酒色时光,粗野直接暴力,自然与“新社会”的文明、规则与节制格格不入(这让人很容易想起《亮剑》中的李云龙)。时间的残酷不是使容颜苍老,而是它会挖空我们的内心而让灵魂无处安放。

Day four

  • 窗边女孩伊芙琳,芳龄十九,正值花季,但却在爱尔兰全社会瘫痪的大背景下,过着平淡,沉闷,简单,而毫无生气的日子。结尾并不意外,也在情理之中。虽然全篇只围绕伊芙琳一个人,但读罢脑海中浮现的只是她的一幅侧影(第三人称视角的因素),甚至还微微地向里转去背对着我们。一方面这是由于伊芙琳本身脆弱,封闭,另一方面也是由于作者偏重刻画内心的现代主义表现手法,将外在景物,生活片段,和过去的记忆不显山不露水地穿插在人物的心理活动中。
  • 至此,金大班应是白先勇笔下最丰满的人物了,或许这其中还蕴含着作者对其现状淡淡的祝福(而非批判)也说不定。因为与前几位主角在现实和新时代中步入“沉沦”相比,金大班的“金盆洗手”终究有种上岸的意味,是人生的崭新一页,也是真性情的回归(这与结尾处的最后慢舞相吻合)。其实文章并不在于强调金大班个人命运,而是从她世故和看破的视角中讲述了后辈其实也不过是自己的轮回而已,真的没有什么改变。

Day five

  • 文章名叫做《赛车之后》,据说是讲述了主人公跟他一帮富贵公子哥儿之间的事情,闹哄哄的,也不知道到底要说啥。
  • 有几点特别之处,一是触角终于伸向了更底层的民众,二是孩子形象的出现,三是直刺心肠的情节处理,没有太多温暖和美感可言(大个子王雄的情感世界好像有些畸形,圆头圆脑的丽儿娇惯蛮横,思维简单,舅母事实上也活在丧夫后毫无安全感的生活中,没有太多依靠和寄托)。金门海滩上老兵童真的笑脸让人印象深刻,是个无心的神来之笔,它似乎指向的是某种遥远但又纯净的东西——大宅院落中的老中少身上都缺少它。本文中既没有如赖鸣升那样好歹曾经风云的男性,也没有如尹雪艳金大班一般的女中豪强,大多数人或许就是如此吧,不是人人都是有那么多故事可以说的主角。

Day six

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  • 延续着上一篇的场景设置——讲述的是另一户宅子里的悲与凉。不过从破屋和新水泥房的比例来看,更多的台北人还是活在“煲鸡汤”与麻将牌的热闹场面里。

Day seven

 

Thomas Friedman & Michael Mandelbaum – That Used to be Us

1. If you see something, say something

  • Jefferey Immelt (former CEO of GE): “What we lack in the U.S. today is the confidence that is generated by solving on big, hard problem — together.”
  • China, getting 90 percent of the potential benefits from its political system; Americans are getting only 50 percent.
  • Narthan Gardels (editor of NPQ): like China U.S. should also tighten up in order to self correct. “Democracy is a consumer society driven by the ethos of immediate gratification is not self-correcting either without a dose of the kind of long-term meritocratic institutions that have served China so well.”

2. Ignoring our problems

  • Kennan’s telegram: American people knew they had to be vigilant, creative and united, in order to avoid losing the competition with their great rival.
  • Charles Vest (former president of MIT): “The United States cannot prosper based on low wages, geographic isolation, or military might. We can prosper only based on brainpower: properly prepared and properly applied brainpower.
  • “no Hitler or Pearl Harbor to shock the nation into action, … no Berlin wall to symbolize the threat to America and the world, no Sputnik circling the Earth proclaiming with every cricket-like chirp of its orbiting signal that we are falling behind in a crucial arena of geopolitical competition.”

3. Ignoring our history

  • “You win in the turns.”
  • five pillars: public education, modernizing infrastructure, immigration, research and development, necessary regulation.
  • David Kennedy (Stanford historian): “(regulations) were not about creating more state control and less private ownership. They were about creating the right synergy between the two.” (such as bankruptcy law) set the stage for more risk-taking, thus more incentive to innovate.
  • big government?? – Suzanne Mettler (Cornell prof. of government) “the threat to democracy today is not the size of government but rather the hidden form that so much of its growth has taken” – people benefit from it but didn’t feel.
  • Jefferey Immelt: “we worship false idols in terms of the power of the free market. The U.S. government has been the catalyst for change for generations.”

Unfortunately, the political debate in America has strayed absurdly from the virtues of our public-private formula. Liberals blame all of America’s problems on Wall Street and big business while advocating a more equal distribution of an ever shrinking economic pie. Conservatives assert that the key to our economic future is simple: close our eyes, click our heels three times, and say “tax cuts,” and the pie will miraculously grow.

4. Up in the air

  • Apple – what has vexed Obama is that Apple and many of its high-tech peers are not nearly avid in creating American jobs – “It isn’t just that workers are cheaper abroad.”
  • Americans work hard, but there are also structural advantages; merger of globalization and IT revolution makes us either better off or worse off?
  • Flat world 1.0 & 2.0, not outsourcing anymore, just source everywhere.
  • after recession it takes longer for the jobs to come back to prerecession levels – the nature of work changed radically from one recession to the next.
  • “creative creators” “routine creators” “creative servers” “routine servers”

5. Help wanted

  • America needs to keep high-skilled manufacturing at home.
  • innovation is continuous nowadays not only take place in big-thinking R&D.
  • “crowdsourcing” and distribute innovation instead of outsourcing to save money.
  • hyper-connected world: innovation takes place from bottom-up instead of top-down.

6. Homework * 2 = the American dream

  • The quality of education cannot exceed the quality of its teachers.
  • Williams rewarded high-school teachers of its students.
  • score difference is associated with parental involvement in the form of reading with their child, talking about what they have done during the day, instead of playing withe their children.

7. Average is over

For decades there has been a struggle between American economy’s desire to increase productivity and the desire to maintain blue-collar and white-collar jobs. We watched as more and more machines, better and better software, and cheaper and cheaper foreign workers replaced American manual laborers and service workers. As noted earlier, we compensated for this loss of blue-collar and white-collar jobs by inflating our housing and retail markets and by expanding local and state governments. But we cannot do that anymore. The only way we can compensate for all those jobs is by inventing new ones or taking old ones and teaching people to do them in new ways that add more value. But that requires more start-ups and better education and more investment in research and development to push out boundaries of science and technology. Today, the Chinese can generate growth just by educating their people enough to do their jobs now done in rich countries. For us to grow, we have to educate people to do jobs that don’t yet exist, which means we have to invent them and train people to do them and at the same time. That is harder, and it is why everyone needs to aspire to be a creative creator or creative server.

8. “This is our due”

  • Reagan: first term deficits balllooned, but took back ore than 40 percent during the second term; Bush: put presidency in jeopardy to keep the deficit under control; Clinton: make deficit reduction one of his top priorities, eventually generate budget surplus in the end.
  • Bush: tax cuts; easily to finance growing budget deficits by borrowing from other countries.

What Milton Friedman had failed to anticipate was that there would never be a global free market in currencies – that countries like Japan and China would manipulate their currencies to support their export growth models, and their export growth models turned out to support our consumption growth model.

  • when funding slows or stops, three unhappy options: raise interest rates triggering economic downturn; printing money triggering inflation; spending cuts and tax increases.

George Orwell – A Collection of Essays

《Such, Such Were the Joys …》

One’s memories grow sharper after a long lapse of time, because one is looking at the past with fresh eyes and can isolate and, as it were, notice facts which previously existed undifferentiated among a mass of others.

Almost all our historical teaching was on this level. History was a series of unrelated, unintelligible but — in some way that was never explained to us — important facts with resounding phrases tied to them.

Although my memories of Bingo are mostly hostile, I also remember considerable periods when I basked under her smiles, when she called me “old chap” and used my Christian name, and allowed me to frequent her private library, where I first made acquaintance with Vanity Fair.

At Crossgates, in term time, the general bareness of life enforced a certain democracy, but any mention of the holidays, and the consequent competitive swanking about cars and butlers and country houses, promptly called class distinctions into being.

One can love a child, perhaps, more deeply than one can love another adult, but is rash to assume that child feels any love in return. Looking back on my own childhood, after the infant years were over, I do not believe that I ever felt love for any mature person except my mother, and even her I did not trust, in the sense that shyness made me conceal most of my real feelings from her.

The weakness of the child is it starts with a blank sheet. It neither understands nor questions the society in which it lives, and because of its credulity other people can work upon it, infecting it with the sense of inferiority and the dread of offending against mysterious, terrible laws.

《Shooting an Elephant》

We began questioning the people as to where the elephant had gone and, as usual, failed to get any definite information. That is invariably the case in the East; a story always sounds clear enough at a distance, but the nearer you get to the scene of events the vaguer it becomes.

The crowd would laugh at me. And my whole life, every white man’s life in the East, was one long struggle not to be laughed at.

Afterwards I was very glad that the coolie had been killed; it put me legally in the right and it gave me a sufficient pretext for shooting the elephant. I often wondered whether any of the others grasped that I had done it solely to avoid looking a fool.

《Politics and the English Language》

A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and the fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.

A mass of Latin words falls upon the facts like soft snow, blurring the outlines and covering up all the details. The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns it as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting out ink.

In prose, the worst thing one can do with words is to surrender to them. When you think of a concrete object, you think wordlessly, and then, if you want to describe the thing you have been visualizing you probably hunt about till you find the exact words that seem to fit it. When you think of something abstract you are more inclined to use words from the start, and unless you make a conscious effort to prevent it, the existing dialect will come rushing in and do the job for you, at the expense of blurring or even changing your meaning.

Political language — and with variations this is true of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists —  is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.

《Why I Write》

Every line of serious work that I have written since 1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic socialism, as I understand it. It seems to me nonsense, in a period like our own, to think that one can avoid writing of such subjects. Everyone writes of them in one guise or another. It is simply a question of which side one takes and what approach one follows.

When I sit down to write a book, I do not say to myself, “I am going to produce a work of art.” I write it because there is some lie that I want to expose, some fact to which I want to draw attention, and my initial concern is to get a hearing. But I could not do the work of writing a book, or even a long magazine article, if it were not also an esthetic experience.

《Inside the Whale》

Here is a world of stuff which you supposed to be of its nature incommunicable, and somebody has managed to communicate it. The effect is to break down, at any rate momentarily, the solitude in which the human being lives. When you read certain passages in Ulysses you feel that Joyce’s mind and your mind are one, that he knows all about you though he has never heard your name, that there exists some world outside time and space in which you and he are together. And through he does not resemble Joyce in other ways, there is a touch of this quality in Henry Miller. Not everywhere, because his work is very uneven, and sometimes, especially in Black Spring, tends to slide away into mere verbiage or into the squashy universe of the surrealists. But read him for five pages, ten pages, and you feel the peculiar relief that comes not so much from understanding as from being understood. “He knows all about me,” you feel; “He wrote this specially for me.” It is as though you could hear a voice speaking to you, a friendly American voice, with no humbug in it, no moral purpose, merely an implicit assumption that we are all alike. For the moment you have got away from the lies and simplification, the stylised, marionette-like quality of ordinary fiction, even quite good fiction, and are dealing with the recognizable experiences of human beings.

Miller is able to get nearer to the ordinary man than is possible to more purposive writers. For the ordinary man is also passive. Within a narrow circle he feels himself master of his fate, but against major events he is as helpless as against the elements. So far from endeavouring to influence the future, he simply lies down and lets things happen to him. During the past ten years literature has involved itself more and more deeply in politics, with the result that there is now less room in it for the ordinary man than at any time during the past two centuries. One can see that change in the prevailing literary attitude by comparing books written about Spanish civil war with those written about the war of 1914-18. The immediately striking thing about the Spanish war books, at any rate those written in English, is their shocking dullness and badness. But what is more significant is that almost all of them, right-wing or left-wing, are written from a political angle, by cooksure partisans telling you what to think, whereas the books about the Greay War were written by common soldiers or junior officers who did not even pretend to understand what the whole thing was about.

Even the best writers of the time can be convicted of a too Olympian attitude, a too great readiness to wash their hands of the immediate practical problem. They see life very comprehensively, much more so than those who come immediately before or after them, but they see it through the wrong end of the telescope.

The outstanding writers of the twenties were of very varied origins, few of them had passed through the ordinary English educational mill, and most of them had had at some time to struggle against poverty, neglect, and even downright persecution. On the other hand, nearly all the younger writers fit easily into the public-school-university-Bloomsbury pattern. The few who are of proletarian origin are of the kind that is declassed early in life, first by means of scholarships and then by the bleaching-tub of London “culture”.

With all its injustices, England is still the land of habeas corpus, and the overwhelming majority of English people have no experience of violence or illegality. If you have grown up in that sort of atmosphere it is not at all easy to imagine what a despotic regime is like. Nearly all the dominant writers of the thirties belonged to the soft-boiled emancipated middle class and were too young to have effective memories of the Great War. To people of that kind such things as purges, secret police, summary executions, imprisonment without trial, etc., etc., are too remote to be terrifying. They can swallow totalitarianism because they have no experience of anything except liberalism.

The atmosphere of orthodoxy is always damaging to prose, and above all it is completely ruinous to the novel, the most anarchical of all forms of literature. How many Roman Catholics have been good novelists? Even the handful one could name have usually been bad Catholics. The novel is practically a Protestant form of art; it is a product of the free mind, of the autonomous individual. No decade in the past hundred and fifty years has been so barren of imaginative prose as the nineteen-thirties. There have been good poems, good sociological works, brilliant pamphlets, but practically no fiction of any value at all. From 1933 onwards the mental climate was increasingly against it. Anyone sensitive enough to be touched by the zeitgeist was also involved in politics. Not everyone, of course, was definitely in the political racket, but practically everyone was on its periphery and more or less mixed up in propaganda campaigns and squalid controversies. Communists and near-Communists had a disproportionately large influence in the literary reviews. It was a time of labels, slogans, and evasions. At the worst moments you were expected to lock yourself up in a constipating little cage of lies; at the best a sort of voluntary censorship was at work in nearly everyone’s mind. It is almost inconceivable that good novels should be written in such an atmosphere. Good novels are not written by orthodoxy-sniffers, nor by people who are conscience-stricken about their own unorthodoxy. Good novels are written by people who are not frightened.

《Reflections on Gandhi》

The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one’s love upon other individuals. No doubt alcohol, tobacco, and so forth, are things that a saint must avoid, but sainthood is also a thing that human beings must avoid.

At the same time there is reason to think that Gandhi, who after all was born in 1869, did not understand the nature of totalitarianism and saw everything in terms of his own struggle against the British government. The important point here is not so much that the British treated him forbearingly as that he was always able to command publicity. As can be seen from the phrase quoted above, he believed in “arousing the world,” which is only possible if the world gets a chance to hear what you are doing. It is difficult to see how Gandhi’s methods could be applied in a country where opponents of the regime disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard of again.

《Looking Back on the Spanish War》

One of the effects of safe and civilised life is an immense oversensitiveness which makes all the primary emotions seem somewhat disgusting. Generosity is as painful as meanness, gratitude as hateful as ingratitude. But in Spain in 1936 we were not living in a normal time. It was a time when generous feelings and gestures were easier than they ordinarily are. I could relate a dozen similar incidents, not really communicable but bound up in my own mind with the special atmosphere of the time, the shabby clothes and the gay-coloured revolutionary posters, the universal use of the word “comrade”, the anti-fascist ballads printed on flimsy paper and sold for a penny, the phrases like “international proletarian solidarity,” pathetically repeated by ignorant men who believed them to mean something. Could you feel friendly towards somebody, and stick up for him in a quarrel, after you had been ignominiously searched in his presence for property you were supposed to have stolen from him? No, you couldn’t; but you might if you had both been through some emotionally widening experience. That is one of the by-products of revolution, though in this case it was only the beginnings of a revolution, and obviously foredoomed to failure.

《England Your England》

English literature, like other literatures, is full of battle-poems, but it is worth noticing that the ones that have won for themselves a kind of popularity are always a tale of disasters and retreats. There is no popular poem about Trafalgar or Waterloo, for instance.

It is quite true that the English are hypocritical about their Empire. In the working class this hypocrisy takes the form of not knowing that the Empire exists. But their dislike of standing armies is as perfectly sound instinct. A navy employs comparatively few people, and it is an external weapon which cannot affect home politics directly. Military dictatorships exist everywhere, but there no such thing as a naval dictatorship.

Why is the goose-step not used in England? There are, heaven knows, plenty of army officers who would be only too glad to introduce some such thing. It is not used because the people in the street would laugh. Beyond a certain point, military display is only possible in countries where the common people dare not laugh at the army.

Another marked characteristic is the emotional shallowness of people who live in a world of ideas and have little contact with physical reality. Many intellectuals of the Left were flabbily pacifist up to 1935, shrieked for war against Germany in the years 1935-39, and then promptly cooled off when the war started. It is broadly though not precisely true that the people who were most “anti-Fascist” during the Spanish civil war are most defeatist now.”

《The Art of Donald McGill》

Anyone who examines his post cards in bulk will notice that many of them are not despicable even as drawings, but it would be mere dilettantism to pretend that they have any direct aesthetic value. A comic post card is simply an illustration to a joke, invariably a “low” joke, and it stands or falls by its ability to raise a laugh.

“Youth’s a stuff will not endure” expresses the normal, traditional attitude. It is this ancient wisdom that McGill and his colleagues are reflecting, no doubt unconsciously, when they allow for no transition stage between the honeymoon couple and those glamourless figures, Mum and Dad.

In England the gap between what can be said and what can be printed is rather exceptionally wide. Remarks and gestures which hardly anyone objects to on the stage would raise a public outcry if any attempt were made to reproduce them on paper. The comic post cards are the only existing exception to this rule, the only medium in which really “low” humour is considered to be printable.

Codes of law and morals, or religious systems, never have much room in them for a humourous view of life. Whatever is funny is subversive, every joke is ultimately a custard pie, and the reason why so large a proportion of jokes centre round obscenity is simply that all societies, as the price of survival, have to insist on a fairly high standard of sexual morality. A dirty joke is not, of course, a serious attack upon morality, but it is a sort of mental rebellion, a momentary wish that things were otherwise. So also with all other jokes, which always centre around cowardice, laziness, dishonesty or some other quality which society cannot afford to encourage. Society has always to demand a little more from human beings than it will get in practice.

《Charles Dickens》

When Dickens has once described something you see it for the rest of your life. But in a way the concreteness of his vision is a sign of what he is missing. For, after all, that is what the merely casual onlooker always sees — the outward appearance, the non-functional, the surfaces of things.

He is a man who lives through his eyes and ears rather than through his hands and muscles.

He shows very little consciousness of the future. When he speaks of human progress it is usually in terms of moral progress — men growing better; probably he would never admit that men are only as good as their technical development allows them to be. At this point the gap between Dickens and his modern analogue, H.G.Wells, is at its widest.

Kenneth Greene – Why Dominant Parties Lose

1. The Puzzle of Single-Party Dominance

  • Majority voters held negative retrospective evaluations of the incumbent, but still planned to vote for it.

In the 1980s, the PRI presided over negative growth rates, record inflation, and dramatic dips in real wages. Although this performance debacle did affect voters, hardship translated into far fewer votes for the opposition than one might expect.

2. A Theory of Single-Party Dominance and Opposition Party Development

  • Incumbent’s access to patronage resources and its use of authoritarian controls, including repression and electoral fraud.

Knowing that the competitive game is rigged those with the most anti-status quo policy preferences. In other words, citizens would have to despise the dominant party’s policies to find it worthwhile to join a costly cause with a low chance of success.

  • Niche parties v.s. catchall parties.

When opposition parties fail to expand and instead remain niche-oriented challengers, they are undercompetitive and fail to coordinate, thus allowing incumbent dominant parties to remain in power.

  • Five types of illicit public resources that dominant parties politicize for partisan purposes: divert funds from budges of SOEs; directly from public budgets; patronage jobs; kickbacks: illicit campaign contributions for economic protections; “administrative resources of the state”.

3. Dominant Party Advantages and Opposition Party Failure, 1930s-1990s

  • “Firefighting” strategy, PRI tacked back-and-forth between the left and right over time; (Huntington) “pragmatic” party that quickly abandoned the left-leaning redistributive ideals of the Mexican Revolution and instead focused on maintaining power.
  • Populism and opportunities on the right in late 1930s: PRI policy shift to the right  and accelerating after 1940s undercut PAN’s appeals, selective and targeted repression raised costs of participation — these twin tools worked so effectively during the next nearly 40 years;
  • Opportunity on the left in the 1940s and 1950s: incumbent’s effective use of patronage to buy off moderates and targeted repression — trimmed the left’s sails, reduce activism to those willing to pay high personal costs for political involvement while reaping uncertain rewards;
  • Further opportunities on the left in the 1970s: repression;
  • Neopopulism and opportunities on the right, 1970-1982: Echeverria, populist style redistribution, undermined a broader leftwing movement, isolated the radical left, opposition forces questioned the usefulness of challenging the PRI, (electoral reform) channeled oppsosition efforts through the electoral process rather than armed rebelion;
  • Why did a new rightwing fail to organize in the 1970s? 1) Echeverria mollified the most important businessmen through key concessions; 2) new rightwing parties found limited support from the middle class: (Echeverria) expanding higher education, middle class, state’s role in industry, raised tariffs, incorporated small business;

Influencing policy from behind the scenes rather than direct political activism was a more comfortable role for big business in any case.

  • Debt crisis, neoliberalism and opportunities on the left in 1980s: in credit crunch due to finance in neopopulist policies and extraction of oil deposits; left slow progress — economic crash softened by state’s large role; PRD failed to develop into a catchall party — 1) (PRI) buy electoral support through massive poverty-alleviation program; 2) leaders in PRD hold comparatively extreme policy preferences; 3) renewed use of repression; 4) fraud.
  • Single party dominance and resource assymetries, revenues of SOEs, support from state treasury — rooted in traditions for many years.

The absence of rotation in Mexico and other dominant party systems leaves the incumbent party free to generate and spend resources with impunity and creates what I called hyper-incumbency advantages.

  • Economic crisis and subsequent restructuring sharply reduced the resources that could be pumped through national patronage system: 1) participation of SOEs diminished; 2) slimmed down the size of federal public bureaucracy; 3) move to more open economy reduced the reach and organizational capacity of the PRI’s sectoral organizations, increased informal workers outside the party’s patronage network;

Both informal sector and service sector workers are comparatively difficult to organize because they tend to be more geographically dispersed than workers in other formal sectors and often have area-specific rather than collective interests.

By 1997 the playing field was quite level and Mexico came as close to many established democracies to a fair or neutral market for votes where no party held an outright pre-electoral advantage.

4. Why participate?

  • Instrumental benefits v.s. expressive benefits: overcome high costs of participation and a low probability of success — such benefits comes from the sheer act of participation.

If group policies reflect ideological, religious, or moral principles, he may feel a responsibility to ‘do his part’ in support of these policies. It is not the actual provision of these collective goods that represents the source of purposive benefits in this case, but the support and pursuit of worthwhile collective goods.

  • Office seekers (top-down) v.s. message seekers (bottom-up). Office seekers more sensitive to changes in political environment.

5. The Empirical Dynamics of Elite Activism

  • Both PRD and PAN favored democracy, but PRD preferred larger role for the state, PAN preferred market-led development; PRI close the center.
  • OLS result (economic and regime policy as dependent): resources and repression statistically significant, education associated with market-led economic development, socio-economic development has no effect.

Economic crisis beginning in 1982 and austerity under free-market restructuring turned voters against the PRI but did not immediately result in support for the opposition. Voters continued to view the challengers as too far to the left or to the right. Only when the free market policy response to the crisis created a leaner public bureaucracy and reduced the overall size of the state’s resources did the PRI’s access to illicit public funds fall. As they did, the partisan playing field leveled and more moderates were willing to join the opposition. However, these catchall-oriented later joiners conflicted with niche-oriented early joiners.

6. Constrained to the Core

  • Mid 1980s, challengers failed to gain support from dissatisfied voters, because they were constrained by their origins (early joiners’ initial socialization) — rigid party organizations that are slow to innovate in the face of new opportunities.
  • Maintain tight links to loyal base, even when the possibility of attracting noncore voters increased — core voters were the opposition’s lifeblood during the lean years.
  • Early joiners, dedicated lives to consciousness raising and local organization building; newer joiners, more likely to recognize the advantages of mass advertising to achieve the more limited goal of winning votes.

7. Dominance Defeated

  • 2000 elections, equalizing opportunities, a fair market where all parties could compete for voters’ sympathies.
  • Fox: more centrist than PAN, closest to voters’ issue preferences, downplayed ideological differences in part because of independent resources —  won as a sensible centrist, not as a radical revolutionary.

Unlike Cardenas, Fox was not organically tied to his party and thus was more capable of making broader centrist appeals even when they conflicted with the preferences of his party’s elites.

8. Extending the Argument to Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan

  • DPARs and DPDRs, similar, while DPDRs do not use authoritatrian controls and instead ensure all freedoms commensurate with democracy and clean operation of electoral institutions.
  • Taiwan 1987-2000, defined as DPAR; DPP: ethnic politics, mobilize native Taiwanese voters; NP: campaigned on unification; KMT: moderate centrist position.
  • KMT’s advantages: 1) convert public resources into partisan goods; 2) party-run or party-invested enterprises. The resource base was threatened due to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and increasingly open domestic markets. Smaller decreases in resource advantages became more consequential due to votes splits between Lien and Song.
  • Malaysia, DPAR since 1971, UMNO catchall, challengers small bases of support and established relatively extreme positions. Public sector growth as a vital role in industrial development and political response of race riots.

One consequence of the huge expansion of the public sector was a decline in accountability and increased scope for the misuse of public funds. This plan not only opened up opportunities for UMNO to enrich itself through proxy companies, but also created a political economy characterized by corruption and cronyism or, in the words of UMNO government, ‘handouts’ for the favored.

  • Private business owners became reliant on UMNO politicians.

Often Chinese businesspeople were forced to accept Malay partners who made little contribution to management but whose contacts with UMNO facilitated dealings with the government. Thus, the state’s major role in the economy transformed the private business community into a willing supporter of the UMNO-led government.

  • UMNO remained in power after the 1997 Asian economic crisis because 1) resisted privatization, remain centrally involved, even briefly increased the share of investment and 2) more repressive to dissidents.
  • Japan, 1955-1993, LDP, right-leaning but still hold the broad center, generated resource advantage in two ways: 1) control over public policy apparatus, use government purse to reward its supporters; 2) business under state protection by colluding with the incumbent.

 

Robert Shiller – The Subprime Solution

1. Introduction

  • Over-promoting homeownership;
  • Effect of financial crisis filtered into other countries, fed back into United States: declining dollars, faltering stock market, more financial failures (IB Bear Stearns);
  • Last crisis, institutional framework changes: new home-loan banking system, private sector reforms (more professional), legislative, insuring banking system, SEC, … become models for similar institutions the world over;
  • Today’s responses, far from enough at least in scale, merely quick fixes that fail to address the full scope of the problem;
  • Short run: prompt and correct bail-outs;
  • Long run: improve financial information infrastructure, extend the scope of financial market to cover wider array of economic risks, provide greater security to customers (create retail financial instruments).

2. Housing in History

  • Home prices “rocket taking off” in the peak of 2006;
  • Different paths, location counts, rate of decline inversely proportional to the speed of increase;
  • Lowest price tier shows biggest boom and drop afterwards.

3. Bubble Trouble

  • Social contagion, epidemics, “new era” stories;
  • Alan Greenspan, acknowledged bubbles, but our models are far too simple; assumes independent rational thinking of individual;
  • Feedback loops, amplified by the news media; price-story-price loop, price-economic activity-price loops; speculative bubbles actually caused by bubbles not fundamentals;
  • Information cascades: disregard their own independent, individually collected information, act instead on general information, squelch their own information, then the quality of group information declines;
  • Rating agencies persisted in giving AAAs, regulators failed to rein in aggressive lending, show no recognition of the boom being the cause of the risks;

America, from its inception, was a speculation.

To a substantial extent, we no longer admired those who were merely hard workers. To be truly revered, one had to be a smart investor as well.

  • Home prices, unlike stock price, move exceptionally smoothly from time to time.

4. The Real Estate Myth

  • Urban patriotism: Californians proud of their pleasant weather and beautiful scenery;
  • Demand for large, walkable urban centers, promote homeownership, restricting new construction is politically fragile.

5. A Bailout by Any Other Name

  • Bailout, Fed offering something unavailable in the marketplace, taking risk by investing in securities that others would not touch;
  • Taxpayers paying for this bailout, tax rebate checks sent to low-income taxpayers, taxpayers paying for the boon of raising loan limits: the losers are disproportionately those people who have prudently been staying out of the housing market bubble;
  • Why necessary: government strive to prevent misfortunes that will create long-standing distrust in economic institutions;
  • Benjamin Friedman: when people see encouraging prospects of the future, they are  better able to work together constructively, supporting democratic principle and political and social liberalization;
  • Systemic effects: financial losses vs. real losses, drop in home values vs. destroy public confidence and the rate of output in the economy falls;
  • Write down the principals of mortgage loans, in the interest of both borrowers and lenders, keep homeowners in place;

6. The Promise of Financial Democracy

  • Fee-only, impartial, useful, comprehensive financial advisers, subsidized by reformed tax policy, especially for low-income people;
  • Designing standard contracts including prudent default option, since people take whatever is offered first or seems conventional; civil law notary;
  • Information disclosure; subsidize creation of enlarged pool of data;
  • New system of unit measurement: UF made Chile the most inflation-aware country in the world; Modigliani-Cohn effect: nominal interest rates were high even though real rates were not; cutting wages in Great Depression; home prices doesn’t basically change over one-hundred years;
  • Derivatives and house futures market: potential to tame speculative bubbles;
  • Other new markets: GDP indexed debts, hedge national economic risks;
  • Continuous-workout mortgages: like regular checkups and preventive care, people pay in advance for the right to bail out, reduce moral hazard by writing into not only borrowers’ income but others’ earning ability;
  • Home equity insurance: prevent homeowners from falling into negative positions, eliminate panic selling, no moral hazard if written on aggregate home value of a city;